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Abstract 
 
This article takes a new idea, ‘normative behaviourism’, and applies it to global political 
theory, in order to address at least one of the problems we might have in mind when accusing 
that subject of being too ‘unrealistic’. The core of this idea is that political principles can be 
justified, not just by patterns in our thinking, and in particular our intuitions and considered 
judgements, but also by patterns in our behaviour, and in particular acts of insurrection and 
crime. The problem addressed is ‘cultural relativism’, understood here not as a meta-ethical 
doctrine, but as the apparent ‘fact’ that people around the world have culturally varying 
intuitions and judgements of a kind that lead them to affirm different political principles. This 
is a problem because it seems to follow (1) that global agreement on any substantial set of 
political principles is impossible, and (2) that any political theory in denial of this ‘fact’ 
would be, for that reason, deeply unrealistic. The solution argued for here is that, if domestic 
political principles (i.e. principles intended to regulate a single state) could be justified by 
normative behaviourism, and in reference to culturally invariant behaviour, then an 
international system supportive of such principles is justifiable by extension.  
 
Introduction 
 
We political theorists are agog with talk of our subject being unrealistic. Although we might 
talk of ‘political theory’ or ‘political philosophy’; of ‘impractical’, ‘unapplied’, ‘unengaged’, 
‘quixotic’, ‘indeterminate’, or even ‘dangerous’; and of ‘ideal’ vs. ‘nonideal’ theory, 
‘moralism’ vs. ‘realism’, ‘utopian’ vs. ‘concessive’ theory, ‘transcendental’ vs. ‘comparative’ 
theory, or even the idea of ‘political political theory’, there can be little doubt that the three 
general questions of whether political theory is unrealistic, in what ways it is unrealistic, and 
what if anything needs to change about the subject as a result, are now central ones (the 
seminal works here include Estlund, 2008; Farrelly, 2007; Geuss, 2008; Sen, 2011; Waldron, 
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2013; and Williams, 2005. For overarching discussion, see Rossi & Sleat, 2014; and 
Valentini, 2012)
1
.  
 
In response to all this, I want to ask an odd question, the relevance of which will become 
clear in a moment: What would our students make of this? The answer, I suspect, is that they 
would be surprised, and not just because they are unaware of the described centrality. 
Insisting that we need some kind of ‘reality check’ more than we need anything else, they 
would also be surprised that it has taken us so long to make these questions so central. 
Somewhat defensively, we might reply that discussions of the gap between theory and 
practice, and between justification and motivation, are as old as Kant, Hobbes, and Plato. Yet 
that reply, as well as ignoring the recent trend from margins to centre (and thus the older 
trend from centre to margins), also rather misses the point. Think here about what it means to 
be ‘realistic’; about what it means to take seriously the gap, if there is one, between political 
theory and ‘real politics’. Amongst other things, I presume that it means taking seriously, not 
just our new objections to the dominant theories of the day, but also the objections of real 
people to what we do. As a result, I think we should take seriously whatever objections our 
students have to the way we do things, and in particular the reasoning behind those 
objections. 
 
This reasoning, subject to distillation, runs as follows. They say ‘the problem with all these 
theories is that they’re too unrealistic’. We say ‘what do you mean by theories?’. They say 
‘either arguments for particular institutions and policies or, more commonly, arguments for 
principles (e.g. of justice) that could be translated, subject to context (e.g. high levels of 
economic development) and local process (e.g. democratic deliberation), into such 
institutions and policies’. We say ‘so what do you mean by too unrealistic?’. They say 
‘because nobody would ever agree to them’. And that is the crucial bit: agreement. Or at 
least, this plus their theories for the impossibility of agreement are the crucial two bits.  
 
Those theories emerge if we push them a bit more. We might say here ‘are you sure that 
nobody would agree?’, to which they would say ‘well, most people’. We would then say, ‘but 
why?’, and then they say roughly the following: (1) some people wouldn’t agree because 
                                                             
1
 There are also three key collections on the topic: A special edition of Social Theory and Practice, 34:3 (2008), 
a special edition of the European Journal of Political Theory, 9:4 (2010); and (Floyd & Stears, 2011). Note that 
by implying that these debates overlap, which they do, I am not saying that they are identical. Realists in 
particular are keen to stress the distinctiveness of their concerns – see (Rossi & Sleat, 2014).  
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they’re too selfish (egoism), (2) some wouldn’t agree because they have naturally different 
intuitions or feelings regarding right and wrong (subjectivism), and (3) some wouldn’t agree 
because they come from different cultures (relativism). And note: these theories imply not 
just that they wouldn’t agree with us, ‘the philosophers’, on whatever particularly ambitious 
set of principles we have in mind, but also with each other, ‘the people’, on any such set. As 
a result, we have a problem, not just of realism – we’re aiming too high – but also of fatalism 
– there’s no point aiming at all. 
 
In this article I want to focus on the third of these theories, given that cultural relativism, to 
use its most common label, has become one of the most prominent barriers to both (1) certain 
theoretical ambitions within political theory, e.g. the justification of universal principles of 
justice, and (2) the kinds of political projects those ambitions require, e.g. the introduction of 
institutions that express such principles
2
. There are though two distinct versions of this 
theory, each of which affects those ‘ambitions’ and ‘projects’ differently. On the first, we 
treat cultural relativism as a meta-ethical doctrine, and then say that a meta-ethical doctrine is 
a fundamental force in the real world. This sounds like the kind of ivory-tower delusion from 
which many of our students think we need to be rescued, though it is really nothing of the 
sort, given that such doctrines, however inchoately and inconsistently held, can be powerful 
movers in the world – and specifically powerful along Luke’s third dimension of power, the 
altering of what people want (Lukes, 2004).  
 
Yet this is not, despite such relevance, the version that interests me here. Instead of the idea 
that different political principles somehow ‘apply’ to different cultures (a notably widespread 
belief across both Western and non-Western countries), I want to consider the apparent ‘fact’ 
that members of different cultures seem to ‘affirm’ different principles in virtue of that 
membership. Or, put differently, whereas the first says that political principles (and thus 
institutions and policies) should somehow track variations in culture, I want to consider the 
idea that people simply people do, as a matter of fact, affirm different political principles as a 
result of differences in their cultural background. This is in part because I cannot consider 
both, but also because I think it is ultimately more threatening to the way that political theory 
                                                             
2
 The most culturally influential argument on this front is A. Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind (New 
York: Simon & Schuster, 1987), esp. 38-39. Within political theory, the issue is mostly treated under 
discussions of ‘multiculturalism’, cf. W. Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: OUP, 1995) with B. 
Barry, Culture and Equality (Cambridge: Polity, 2001).  
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normally operates - for reasons that will become clear - and thus more plausible as grounds 
for that subject being labelled ‘unrealistic’. 
 
What though has all of this got to do with specifically international or global political theory 
(and from now on I stick with global
3
)? The connection is that it is here that cultural 
relativism is at its most problematic, and for at least three reasons. First, because it is where 
the gap between ideals and reality is at its greatest, whether one considers the gap between 
theories of ‘global justice’ and contemporary global inequality, or the gap between theories of 
‘just war’ and contemporary armed conflict. Second, because attempts to bridge that gap are 
easily portrayed as imperialistic attempts to impose Western ideals on non-Western cultures
4
. 
And third, because cultural variation in terms of the affirmation of different political 
principles seems to be much more significant between countries than within them, in the 
simple sense that there is more variety of this kind across the globe as a whole than in any 
one part of it. All of which suggests, regardless of whatever other problems apply, that the 
gap between the principles global political theorists propose, and the reality of global 
politics, might be very great indeed.  
 
With this gap in mind, the rest of the article now unfolds into three stages. First, I discuss 
what I take to be the standard method of arguing for political principles in political theory, of 
both the domestic and global kind, and explain why it is more vulnerable to the problem of 
cultural relativism than is generally assumed. This method I describe as ‘thinking about 
thinking’, just insofar as it tries to turn patterns in things like our intuitions and considered 
judgements into principles for regulating our political existence. Second, I discuss how an 
alternative method might avoid the problem of cultural relativism. This method I call 
‘normative behaviourism’, and it works by turning patterns in the way that we behave in 
response to particular policies and institutions into principles that justify either the same or 
further policies and institutions. Third, I explore how normative behaviourism might deliver a 
realistic response to cultural relativism at the specific level of global political theory. 
 
                                                             
3
 One might think that the phrase ‘international’ political theory suggests theory for a world that either is, or 
should stay, fundamentally Westphalian, with ‘global’ suggesting a more cosmopolitan bent. I use the term 
‘global political theory’ as a catch-all for both approaches. 
4
 For useful discussion, see: S. Caney (2005) Justice Beyond Borders: A Global Political Theory (Oxford: 
OUP), 25-62; L. May, Global Justice and Due Process (Cambridge: CUP), 37-43; A.M. Jaggar (2005) ‘”Saving 
Amina”: Global Justice for Women and Intercultural Dialogue’. Ethics & International Affairs, 19:03, 55-75; 
and M. Risse (2012), Global Political Philosophy (London: Palgrave), 40-61. 
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‘Thinking about thinking’ and the problem of cultural relativism 
 
We start then with what I see as the standard method of doing political theory, by which I 
mean the standard method of justifying political principles. This method is a form of 
introspection (Floyd, forthcoming-b)
5
. It involves the study of a particular set of thoughts 
within either the heads of all reasonable individuals, often referred to as ‘we’ or ‘us’, or the 
heads of the members of a particular group, such as ‘modern Westerners’. These are the 
thoughts political philosophers have in mind, no pun intended, when using terms such as 
‘moral intuition’, ‘considered judgement’, ‘conviction’, ‘commitment’, and so forth. As a 
class, they are what I have called elsewhere our ‘normative thoughts’, because in contrast to 
descriptive beliefs, they are thoughts about either what should or should not be the case in the 
world or what we should or should not do within it (Floyd, forthcoming-a). For example, the 
thought that we would save a child drowning in a pond if we could do so at little cost to 
ourselves is a normative thought, as is the thought that selfishness and ignorance ought not to 
affect our choice of principles of justice, and the thought that it is wrong to burn ants with a 
magnifying glass
6
. 
 
The point of studying these thoughts, as stated, is to justify political principles, by which I 
mean principles capable of telling us how to regulate our collective political existence. 
Consider, as examples, Pettit’s claim that ‘the intuition from which republicans begin [is] that 
domination is a salient evil, and that removing it or reducing it is a more or less unambiguous 
enterprise’ (Pettit, 1997, 103), or Barry’s claim that his ‘argument presupposes a certain 
desire: the desire to live in a society whose members all freely accept its rules of justice and 
its major institutions’ (Barry, 1995, 164), or Christiano’s claim that his argument ‘relies on 
the intuitive strength of the starting premises concerning the dignity of persons and the 
importance of well-being in the argument for equality’ (Christiano, 2008, 5). Consider how 
                                                             
5
 I have also used ‘the standard model’ and, most commonly, ‘mentalism’, as labels for this method, depending 
on the aspects of it I want to emphasise and the context in which it is being discussed. It’s worth stressing that 
such labels are completely interchangeable, though again, for the comprehensive treatment, see (Floyd, 
forthcoming-b). 
6
 Note that these thoughts can be either targeted judgements, e.g. ‘don’t hit peter’ or general principles, e.g. 
‘only hit in self-defence’, depending on their level of generality. For example, if I affirm the principle GR – 
‘only treat others as you would wish to be treated’ – then I hold the normative thought GR. This distinction 
might be pertinent in what follows, though it will not matter very much if it is true – and I believe it is true – that 
any affirmation of a particular judgement commits one to a general principle of much the same form. For 
example, if I think that I should not hit Peter right now, then presumably I am committed to a principle which 
says, at the least, that if all the current conditions in the world should pertain again in the future (call them ‘set 
of circumstances X’), then it would be wrong once more to hit Peter, meaning that I accept a principle of the 
form ‘never hit Peter under set of circumstances X’.  
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Nozick undermines egalitarianism by comparing redistributive taxation to, and thus invoking 
our thoughts about, forced labour, whilst Dworkin seeks to support it by imagining the kind 
of justice we might pursue on a desert island (Nozick, 1974, 169; Dworkin, 2002). Or 
consider how Daniels talks of the widely held view that ‘a moral theory consists of a set of 
moral judgements plus a set of principles that account for or generate them’ (Daniels, 1979, 
256), how Scanlon describes his reasonable rejection principle as a ‘characterisation of the 
common element implicit in our judgements of wrongness’ (Scanlon, 1992, 21), and, most 
famously of all, how Rawls describes his argument as ‘a theory of our moral sentiments as 
manifested by our considered judgements in reflective equilibrium’ (Rawls, 1971, 120), and 
thus as ‘a more discriminating interpretation of our moral sensibilities’ (ibid, 587).  
 
The key idea, in each case, is simply to tell us what we should think, when it comes to 
political principles, on the basis of what we already think, either about politics itself, or about 
some matter that is taken to be analogous to politics in just the right way – hence ‘thinking 
about thinking’. Or is this a mistake? One might after all object here by insisting that the 
point of political theory is to tell us what we should think about politics regardless of what 
we currently think, and that anything less than this is unduly conservative, or ideological, or 
regressive, or some such appellate. Yet consider, whatever portion of our ‘current’ thoughts 
we end up eliminating, we only ever do so by reference to a still further group of such 
thoughts. We might, for example, eliminate some normative thoughts due to (1) their 
inconsistency with the majority of our thoughts of this kind, (2) their inconsistency with a set 
of thoughts to which we cling more dearly, and which we thus think is a more important set 
of thoughts, or (3) their holding implications, including political implications, that are 
inconsistent in the same way
7
. The bigger picture is thus always one in which thoughts are 
sovereign. Whether we are dealing in runaway trolleys or children drowning in ponds, we are 
always essentially being told: ‘because you do think this, you should also think that’.  
 
So where does cultural relativism come in? In order to see this, we need to go back to the 
point about group size – that is, the point that the group of people whose thoughts we are 
studying, and for whom a set of principles is intended, can vary from all of humanity to just a 
sub-set of it (and for an interesting position on whose thoughts matter, see Miller, 1999). In 
fact, we might usefully say, given my purposes here, that there are essentially two different 
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 This is often done under the rubric of ‘reflective equilibrium’ or ‘coherentism’, though it need not be. The 
method described here is both older and more general than discussions of those concepts tend to suggest. 
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forms the described method can take: universalistic and contextualist. In the first case we 
study the normative thoughts of every human being, or at least of all reasonable human 
beings, in the hope of generating principles that apply to all human beings (though those 
principles might still be subject to universal rules of contextual applicability, e.g. ‘only 
introduce democratic principles under conditions of high material well-being’), whilst in the 
second we study the normative thoughts of just a select group, such as ‘contemporary 
Westerners’, or ‘Chinese people between the ages of 20 and 50’, in the hope of generating 
principles that apply only to that group.  
 
This distinction matters because, in order to see the problems caused by cultural relativism, 
we need to see that it affects the two forms in different ways. In the first case, the problem is 
that, if individuals in different cultures (1) turn out to have sufficiently different normative-
thought-sets, in the sense of differences great enough to commit them to different political 
principles (for small thought-differences might not lead to principle-differences), and (2) such 
differences survive even after due reflection (i.e. consideration of all relevant thoughts), then 
this makes universalism impossible, whilst apparently leaving contextualism intact, just so 
long as the posited ‘group’ occurs at the right ‘level’ of culture – that is, at whatever level one 
has to go down to in order to find sufficiently similar normative thoughts (i.e. thoughts 
similar enough to generate the same political principles). All of which is welcome news to 
contextualists. Yet there is still a sting in the tail. In this second case, and bearing in mind the 
subject of this article, it is hard to see how principles that apply only to a particular group 
could ever be applied to the globe as a whole, in the form of principles of ‘just war’, ‘global 
justice’, and so on. As a result, it becomes easy to see, not just why many moral universalists 
are happy to be political cosmopolitans, for that is obvious, but also why many contextualists, 
including some ‘practice-dependence’ theorists, take up ‘nationalist’ or ‘statist’ positions8. 
Yet such illumination, despite this interesting connection between the methodological and the 
normative, is not really the point here. The key thing is this: if these problems do apply, then 
global political theory appears to be impossible. 
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 For an illustrative range of contextualist positions, see James (2008), Miller (2007), and Sangiovanni (2008), 
though note that one’s commitment to contextualism could be moral rather than methodological (or indeed both 
moral and methodological), in the sense that one might believe, like Miller, that ‘people greatly value living 
under their own rules and according to their own cultural beliefs’ (Miller, 2007, 21). Similarly, one might 
believe, as many realists do, that legitimacy is the key political concern, in which case it matters, at least on their 
view of legitimacy, what a particular group of people happens to believe is legitimate (Williams, 2005).  
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That is, assuming (1) that I am accurately describing the standard modus operandi of political 
theory, and (2) that the normative thoughts of individuals in different cultures differ enough 
to commit them to different political principles, then it seems to follow (3) that cultural 
relativism is a problem worth taking seriously, especially in (4) global political theory, given 
the need for principles to somehow apply to (i.e. be justified for) individuals across a range of 
cultures. Of course, at this point, I have only sketched out my reasoning for (1), and have 
provided no evidence at all for (2), yet given the plausibility of both notions (in terms of 
familiarity or recognisability), that seems enough reason for now to at least consider an 
alternative way of doing things. 
 
Normative behaviourism 
 
Consider then that the standard method of justifying political principles, if I am right, works 
by looking for principle-shaped patterns in the way that we think. That is, it works by looking 
to see what principles ‘we’ might be committed to, in virtue of the normative thoughts we 
already hold, where we might mean 7 thousand or even 7 billion individuals. By contrast, 
normative behaviourism works by contemplating patterns in the way that we behave. Instead 
of studying, for example, the choices we imagine we would make in hypothetical scenarios, 
and then seeing what those choices tell us in terms of our nascent principle-commitments, it 
studies the choices individuals do make, in the real world, and in response to particular 
policies and institutions.  
 
And not just any choices. It studies forms of behaviour that express a strong negative verdict 
on either (1) particular institutions and policies (e.g. autocratic institutions or totalitarian 
policies) or (2) the ways of life those institutions and policies facilitate (e.g. lives of poverty 
and inequality). As a result, it studies, in particular, insurrection and crime, with the former 
treated as expressing a negative verdict on (1) and the latter on (2). What makes these two 
really interesting is that they involve considerable personal risk, and thus require considerable 
personal commitment, even if that commitment is based simply on an aversion to alternative 
courses of action. So, unlike a hypothetical choice made from an armchair, whether to save a 
child or turn a trolley, these are dangerous choices, and so highly illuminating regarding an 
individual’s priorities. And, more interestingly still, if high numbers of people engage in 
these acts in the presence of particular institutions and policies, regardless of cultural 
variations, and over long periods of time, then that starts to tell us something very clear 
9 
 
regarding the way those people feel, not just about those institutions and policies, but also 
about the political principles those institutions and policies express.  
 
Let me try and explain that last claim. My suggestion is that, just as we might affirm a 
political principle on the basis that we are committed to it via a hypothetical choice scenario – 
for this is the easiest comparison in terms of our normative thoughts - so we might come to 
reject a political principle by realising that lots of people find it deeply unpalatable in 
practice. For example, if lots of people act so as to reject fascist institutions, having had the 
chance to live with them, then it seems as though (1) they are thereby rejecting fascist 
political principles, and (2) the rest of us also have reason to reject such principles, as fellow 
human beings likely to have a similar response. There is nothing, I think, particularly 
controversial about that claim. What is controversial is my next claim: that this kind of 
reasoning can also lead us to affirm a distinct set of political principles, and in particular the 
principles of what Americans tend to call liberalism, Europeans tend to call Social 
Democracy, and political philosophers tend to call egalitarianism. 
 
This claim rests upon two premises: (1) that there are clear empirical trends in the way that 
human beings respond to at least some political institutions and policies, such that they 
reveal, en masse, though again, only over long periods of time, a strong expressed preference 
for democracies over non-democracies, liberal democracies over illiberal democracies, and 
egalitarian liberal democracies over inegalitarian liberal democracies; and (2) that there are 
sufficient reasons, at least for most of us, to affirm the political principles constitutive of 
egalitarian liberal democracy on the basis of those empirical trends. These premises are 
argued for in different ways. The first breaks down into a finding that liberal-democracies 
generate less insurrection than their alternatives, and a finding that egalitarian liberal-
democracies – understood here as liberal-democracies with smaller wealth and opportunity 
gaps between top and bottom - generate less crime than their alternatives. As a result, it relies 
upon a wide range of empirical studies supportive of these two findings, the strength of which 
I will largely assume here, though it’s worth nothing, for the sake of clarity, that The Polity 
report is a cornerstone of the first
9
, whilst Wilkinson and Pickett’s The Spirit Level is a 
cornerstone of the second
10
. 
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 See http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. Further supportive studies include: C.A. Crocker, 
“Engaging Fragile States”, Foreign Affairs 82, no. 5 (2003); Freedom House, The Worst of the Worst: The 
World’s Most Repressive Societies (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2004). R. Rotberg, When States Fail: 
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So what about the second premise? This is the really tricky one, assuming that we can put the 
described empirical trends to one side. One option would be to think about how political 
theory looks when adopting a god-like view – the ‘I-expect-you’d-all-like-to-know-what-I-
would-do-if-I-ruled-the-world’ view (Waldron, 1999, 1) - and when adopting some form of 
prioritarianism. On this basis, we might say that the described empirical trends tell us which 
set of political principles, in practice, produce the least suffering, and so should be 
implemented for that reason, in which case we would be using such trends in order to 
translate a more general moral principle into specific political principles. A second option, in 
turn, would be to treat our choices to rebel, or commit crime, as grounds from which political 
principles can be directly derived. Bearing in mind the way in which we sometime use 
hypothetical choices, whether in Hobbes’ ‘state of nature’, Rawls’ ‘original position’, or even 
Cohen’s ‘camping trip’ (Cohen, 2009), we might just say that these ‘real’ choices, as 
expressed by our behaviour, somehow already entail a commitment to a particular set of 
political principles, without reference to a deeper principle or set of principles that explains 
their relevance.  
 
Yet I do not want to take either of these routes here, despite believing that there is much to be 
said for the second. Instead I want to describe a third possibility, and in order to do so I want 
to start off by pointing out that one front on which contemporary political theory struggles is 
the problem of individual human motivation. That is, although there has been some recent 
discussion of the concept of motivation as part of the task of making assessments of political 
feasibility (cf. Estlund, 2011 with Wiens, 2013), we still do not consider what would actually 
motivate people to support, in practice, a given conception of justice. This is odd not just 
because an un-motivating conception of justice might also be, for that reason, an unjustified 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Causes and Consequences (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003); M. Besancon, ‘Good Governance 
Rankings: The Art of Measurement’, in World Peace Foundation Reports, No. 36 (Cambridge, MA: World 
Peace Foundation, 2003); H. Hegre, T. Ellingsen, S. Gates, & N.P. Gleditsch, “Towards a Democratic Civil 
Peace? Democracy, Political Change, and Civil War, 1816-1992”, American Political Science Review, 95, no. 1 
(2001), 33-48; Fund for Peace, ‘The Failed States Index’, Foreign Policy (2008), May ⁄ June; J. Di John, 
“Conceptualising the Causes and Consequences of Failed States: A Critical Review of the Literature”, LSE 
Crisis States Research Centre Working Papers, 25 (2008). 
10
 Further supportive studies include: C.C. Hsieh & M.D. Pugh, ‘Poverty, income inequality, and violent crime: 
A meta-analysis of recent aggregate data studies’, Criminal Justice Review, 18 (1993), 182-202; United Nations 
Crime and Justice Information Network, Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems (New York, NY: United Nations, 2000); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United States 
(Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1990-2000). M. Kelly, ‘Inequality and Crime’, The Review 
of Economics and Statistics 82:4 (2000), 530-539; E. Neumayer, ‘Inequality and violent crime: evidence from 
data on robbery and violent theft’, Journal of Peace Research, 42 (2005), 101-112 For further discussion, see 
(Floyd, forthcoming-b). 
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one, or indeed an illegitimate one, but also because one would think that a commitment to 
discovering and implementing justice in the world would bring with it the desire to find out 
just how such implementation might garner support. Consider, for example, that even 
assuming that a particular set of political principles (e.g. principles of justice) captures a 
relevant set of normative thoughts (e.g. my considered judgements regarding cases of 
injustice), I might still ask: why should I support those principles, in practice, over other 
principles, such as those which serve the material well-being of my family? Or: What is there 
to motivate me to prioritise justice, even assuming that I agree with you regarding what it 
asks of me? 
 
To be clear, I am not arguing that this is the fundamental or indeed only question with which 
political philosophers should concern themselves. Assuming that there is, for example, any 
one conception of justice on which we should agree, then clearly uncovering the process of 
justifying that conception is going to reveal, amongst other things, some reasons that might 
motivate us to adopt it in practice, whether we are god-like legislators or day-to-day 
citizens
11
. But there is still a separate question. Knowing what justice is, what legitimacy is, 
what rights are, and indeed, what love is, what friendship is, what happiness is, what 
excellence is – even knowing all of these things, I still have to decide what to prioritise, and 
thus how to act. Political theory still has to meet practical reason, in the sense that the 
question ‘what should I think about justice/legitimacy/etc.?’ still has to meet the question 
‘what should I do?’. All of which means, I assume, that it is a point in favour of any set of 
political principles if they lend themselves to an answer to this second question; if, that is, 
they lend themselves to a credible account of how an ordinary and rational human being 
might be motivated to support them. 
 
So, with this in mind, I now suggest, as briefly as possible, four reasons that function as 
answers to both questions – and thus as both justification and motivation - for egalitarian-
liberal-democratic principles, with the point being simply to sketch out how a spread of such 
reasons might convince people, not just to think that such principles are ‘a good thing’, but 
also that it is in their ‘interests’, however broadly conceived, to support them. First, if the 
described trends reveal the principles which, in practice, most people tend to prefer, then it 
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 Though note, if there is not just one such conception, then the question of what actually motivates us in 
practice might well become the more important one. For an argument to the effect that there is not just one such 
conception - or at least, not one such conception as justified by the method described in the previous section - 
see (Floyd, forthcoming-b). 
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would be a prudent guess on my part to decide that I am likely to feel the same way. Second, 
if those trends reveals the principles that produce the least suffering, then, assuming I care 
about the well-being of others, that is a reason for me to affirm those principles. Third, if they 
reveal which principles produce the fewest objections on the part of others, then, assuming 
that I affirm something like the ‘liberal principle of legitimacy’ (Rawls, 2005), that is a 
reason for me to affirm those principles. Fourth, if they reveal the principles which, in 
practice, produce the most stable and secure environment for myself and my loved ones, then 
again, that is a reason for me to affirm those principles. And so, as a result, if we can assume 
that the described empirical trends hold, and also that enough of us want to, for example, 
minimise suffering, maximise principle-acceptance (and thus perceived legitimacy), or 
promote security for ourselves and our nearest and dearest - and it is not necessary for all 
individuals to be motivated by the same things
12
 - then there is a route here, it seems, from 
observed patterns in human behaviour to the justification of political principles.  
 
Or is there? At this point, I doubt anybody would be particularly convinced by what I have 
sketched out. Some will doubt those empirical patterns, whilst others will think that I am 
moving from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’, or from ‘facts’ to ‘principles’, in an unacceptable fashion 
(Floyd, forthcoming-b). Relatedly, one might also wonder why we should even consider 
utilising normative behaviourism if the standard method of arguing for political principles, as 
described in the previous section, is working perfectly fine (Floyd, forthcoming-b). Yet what 
if is not working fine, bearing in mind in particular (1) our present interest in applying 
normative behaviourism to global political theory, and (2) the problem of cultural relativism, 
as considered earlier, and as it apparently applies to that subject? Again, given this 
possibility, it seems sensible to find out just how normative behaviourism fares on these two 
fronts, and thus to put to one side those other problems, especially as they are only worth 
taking on provided that there is some such pay-off at the end of the road. 
 
Remember then what I said earlier: that if our political principles rest upon our normative 
thoughts, and our normative thoughts vary enough across cultures to commit us to different 
political principles, then this is a problem for global political theory (without even 
considering the possibility that they vary even within societies, including in particular 
                                                             
12
 On this front, normative behaviourism is aligned with some theories of deliberative democracy, according to 
which it is perfectly fine for different people to affirm a given proposition, or indeed policy, for very different 
reasons – meaning that what counts is simply agreement on a particular conclusion, not the reasoning that leads 
to it. See, e.g. (Bohman, 1995).  
13 
 
multicultural societies). Consider, for example, the empirical finding that, when given the 
hypothetical choice between convicting an innocent individual in order to avoid a riot, or 
freeing that individual and thus triggering the riot, Chinese subjects are significantly more 
likely than American subjects (of European descent) to think that the first option is acceptable 
(Doris & Plakias, 2008, 324). The worry here is that if differences of this kind run deep 
enough to ensure that no one set of global political principles could be justified for even a 
majority of the global population, then we have a serious challenge on our hands. As a result, 
the key question becomes whether normative behaviourism helps with that specific challenge, 
to which the general answer, or so I hope, is that it does so by moving our attention away 
from culturally-variant thoughts of this kind, and towards culturally-invariant behaviour of 
the sort described earlier, at least if we focus, as stated, on long term trends and large 
numbers of people (for nobody denies that culture influences responses to principles-in-
practice in the short-run).  
 
Let me explain that answer. Consider how a woman might say that she is not addicted to 
cigarettes, despite smoking twenty a day for the past thirty years, or how a man might say 
that he is not gay, despite repeatedly engaging in homosexual acts, or how a teenager might 
say that she/he doesn’t care about anyone, despite regularly helping out others for no personal 
reward. In each case, crucially, cultural norms influence the language people use to describe 
their intentions, motivations, and values. But not just their language: They also affect what 
people actually think, at least at one level, is wrong (and note: I deliberately use the term 
think rather than either believe or feel in order to avoid taking a position on cognitivism/non-
cognitivism). The woman, for example, might think that addiction shows personal failure; the 
man might think homosexuality is sinful, or a failure of masculinity; the teenager might think 
that altruism shows a pathetic lack of transgression. Yet their behaviour tells us something 
else.  
 
This is why I have suggested, elsewhere, that an apt slogan for normative behaviourism 
would be ‘actions (sometimes) speak louder than thoughts’ (Floyd, forthcoming-a), where 
‘louder’ means both ‘more clearly’, given the often messy and inconsistent nature of our 
thinking, and ‘with greater authenticity and commitment’, given the risks involved with 
insurrection and crime. By contrast, our moral intuitions, our considered judgements, and the 
decisions we imagine we would make in hypothetical choice situations – all of these can be 
misleading in terms of revealing where our ‘real’ preferences lie. Which is not, of course, to 
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say that actions always speak louder than thoughts or words – hence the parentheses in the 
slogan – but simply to say that it is plausible that at least certain kinds of action might have 
more relevance in terms of our preferences across different political principles than certain 
kinds of thought. 
 
So: normative behaviourism has at least the potential to help us with the described 
difficulties, just so long as (1) it is able to justify any principles at all, and (2) it draws on 
patterns of behaviour that are sufficiently culturally invariant. As to how this precisely plays 
out at the level of global political theory – that is what we turn to now.  
 
Normative behaviourism and (realistic) global political theory 
 
Consider here that the standard case I have described for normative behaviourism holds that 
if a set of political principles, in practice, elicits less expressed discontent, in the form of 
insurrection and crime, over long periods of time, and for large numbers of people, then they 
are the best principles domestically. That is, they are the principles a society should choose 
for itself based on what we know of how various societies have fared in the past with a 
variety of political principles. This makes the relevance of normative behaviourism for 
principles intended to regulate a global order, of Westphalian or cosmopolitan character, 
unclear. What relevance could insurrection have, given that, when people rebel against their 
government, they generally do not do so as a protest against the international system of the 
day? What relevance could crime have when a society’s high crime-rate is more often 
causally attributable to (and so the perceived responsibility of) domestic politics than the 
international system? Of course, there are exceptions to these trends. We do sometimes 
directly oppose the international system in these ways (e.g. anti-globalisation protests), and 
sometimes indirectly (e.g. various riots in Greece over the last few years). But this is not the 
norm. So again: what on earth could normative behaviourism have to do with global political 
principles? 
  
There are two possibilities here. First, we might look at distinctively international forms of 
behaviour of similar ilk to insurrection and crime, such as war, violent anti-globalisation 
protests, or illegal migration, in the hope that they can be treated as expressions of 
judgements, not just about the present international system, but also about the principles it 
expresses in its design and operation. This focus might lead to arguments in favour of, say, 
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just war, cosmopolitan global governance, or open borders. Second, we might argue that, if 
normative behaviourism justifies domestic egalitarian liberal democracy, then it might also 
justify, by extension, whatever international or global system best supports it (i.e. whatever 
system would best support a world of such states). This would then connect normative 
behaviourism to an argument often heard on the political left over the last twenty or so years 
– that neoliberal globalisation, and its regulatory and fiscal race to the bottom, needs 
somehow to be tamed in order for national social-democracy to remain viable
13
.  
 
Yet that connection, unfortunately, also reveals a potential conflict between the two 
possibilities, given that the first might lead to an opposing conclusion to the second, and thus 
yet another front on which cosmopolitans might face off against statists/nationalists/realists. 
So what to do? My approach will be to focus solely on the second possibility – call it ‘making 
the world safe for social democracy’. This is in part because there is not the room to explore 
both – and one can only assess the described potential conflict having explored each of them 
– but also because the former requires a much deeper kind of exploration, given its need of an 
account regarding why these new forms of behaviour might be relevant to the justification of 
political principles, and thus a return to the very idea of normative behaviourism. The second 
possibility, by contrast, allows me to assume that idea as a fairly clear (if by no means fully 
justified) background.  
 
So what can be said for this second approach? Actually not very much at all. The core of the 
argument is simple: Assuming (1) that the standard way of justifying political principles fails 
us as the global level, as indicated, (2) that the behavioural data described holds, regardless of 
culture, and (3) that normative behaviourism is a valid way of justifying political principles, 
then we have at least a prima facie reason for adopting whatever global political reforms are 
entailed by such principles (e.g. global fiscal rules designed to avoid tax-competition between 
states, or international labour standards designed to avoid a regulatory race to the bottom in 
terms of working practices), provided of course that the implications of such adoption would 
not be of a kind that calls into question those initial principles (where ‘implications’ includes, 
at the least, whatever behaviour is likely to result from such adoption)
14
. As a result, the way 
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 This was a staple of discussions surrounding the ‘Third Way’. See (Giddens, 1998). 
14
 This is in parallel with reflective equilibrium, according to which the implications of a set of principles can 
give us reason to change the justificatory story behind them, and thus also the principles themselves.  
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to argue for this position is not really to argue for it all, but rather to argue against either 
alternatives or objections to it
15
. 
 
Yet that does not mean any objections or alternatives, i.e. whatever ‘straw men’ or ‘aunt 
sallies’ can be mustered for rhetorical effect, but rather the strongest objections possible. As a 
result, I want to consider an objection that relates to the specific concerns of global political 
theory, as stemming from two things in particular: (1) cosmopolitan arguments regarding 
global governance, and (2) what appears to be the natural conservative bias of normative 
behaviourism. This objection goes as follows. First, note how normative behaviourism 
attempts to justify political principles of the basis of their record in practice. Second, note that 
this means historically-tested principles. Third, note that this leads to at least two difficulties: 
(A) in the past (say, before the 20
th
 century), it could not have justified social democracy, 
given that we had no empirical knowledge of such a system; (B) in the present, it could never 
justify a cosmopolitan global order (or, for example, a ‘true’ democratic-socialist domestic 
order), given that, again, we have no empirical knowledge of such things. As a result, 
normative behaviourism appears to be an absurd form of ‘end of history’ thinking, according 
to which the present is valorised as the pinnacle of historical progress.  
 
This, I believe, is the key objection to normative behaviourism, at least at the level of global 
political theory, though I believe it can be rebutted, just so long as one can show how a 
cosmopolitan global order (whatever precise form such an order might take) is not 
necessarily ruled out by the case I have advanced so far.  
 
Central to this rebuttal is the idea of an ‘experiment’. Normative behaviourism, we might say, 
and without denying the first part of the objection under consideration, essentially treats 
political history as a set of historical experiments regarding the way in which political 
principles perform in practice, and so evaluates those principles in terms of the extent to 
which they generate specific kinds of behaviour – insurrection and crime. Yet that is not the 
end of experimentation. Looking forward, the idea then becomes to try out new principles, 
whilst recognising (1) that we should not regurgitate principles that we already know 
(eventually) fail in practice and (2) that there might be no way of fully justifying such 
principles until enough time has passed.  
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 In this respect I follow Mill, who once declared –and it is an under-appreciated point – that three quarters of 
any normative case of this sort has to be argument against the alternatives (Mill, 1974, 98).  
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That second point, however, touches again upon something I have repeatedly tried to side-
line – the rivalry between normative behaviourism and the described ‘standard’ method of 
justifying political principles. As a result, it is worth pointing out that I believe – and have 
argued elsewhere (Floyd, 2011; Floyd, forthcoming-b) - that the latter method cannot deliver 
the goods in the way - or at least to the extent – that its practitioners hope. This is because 
conflicts between normative thoughts both within and across individuals (e.g. conflicting 
intuitions within one mind, and between two or more individuals), and even within cultures, 
are sufficiently large to lead to conflicts between the political principles they affirm, even 
after sufficient reflection (e.g. via ‘wide reflective equilibrium’). Yet this is not something we 
need to assume in order to accept the point about experimentation. For now, even if we think, 
like Parfit (1984), and unlike MacIntyre (1984) – and note the shared year of publication - 
that the current model of ethical enquiry is a young subject, and should be given time to find 
its truths, it is enough to see that there is no harm in taking such an experimental approach, 
given that - and who would argue against this? - we currently do not agree, at either the 
academic or political level, upon either domestic or global political principles. 
 
Yet this still leaves the cosmopolitan half of the objection outstanding. If a commitment to 
human moral equality, when appropriately interpreted, leads to cosmopolitan principles of 
global governance, then what can a normative behaviourist say that would find common 
ground with such a position?  
 
In order to answer that question, I want to draw on Pasternak’s recent discussion of the idea 
of a ‘league of democracies’ (Pasternak, 2012). The argument here is that our primary goal, 
in terms of international reform, should be for mature liberal democracies to construct their 
own governance framework, rather than diluting that framework, in terms of regulatory bite, 
and from the point of view of liberal values, in order to include everyone else. Crucially, she 
argues not just that this is a viable and attractive project in the short term, but also one that 
offers, at least potentially, a viable and attractive route to cosmopolitan global governance, 
whereby other countries steadily join that framework when ready. As a result, the argument 
covers its tracks in the right way, given that, even if such an end-point turns out not to be 
attractive in and of itself, it remains the case that whatever steps were taken in that direction 
would have been small, peaceful, and legitimate ones. All of which chimes rather nicely with 
normative behaviourism, given that the proposal is for small and feasible steps from an 
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arrangement that we already know is attractive, to a sequence of reversible stages that could 
be evaluated in practice, before proceeding any further. All of which should appeal to both 
cosmopolitans and statists, given that we are essentially shoring egalitarian-liberal-
democratic principles today, without ruling out cosmopolitan governance tomorrow.  
 
Remember though, one more time, the challenge of cultural relativism, given that it reminds 
us not to concede more than this to the cosmopolitans. This is because, if cosmopolitans rely 
upon Western normative thoughts as a basis for justifying global political principles, then 
they too have reason to be interested in a method of justification that bypasses whatever bias 
there is in that selection. And indeed, not just cosmopolitans. Consider also that realists, 
whether focused on power (in international relations) or legitimacy (in political theory), have 
similar reason to think that this is a more appropriate way of proceeding when it comes to 
justifying a genuinely shared idea of global political progress. This is because normative 
behaviourism, by working up principles from the real preferences expressed by real people, 
and in response to real political institutions and policies, does not face the problems of 
feasibility, illegitimacy, or general ignorance of ‘real politics’, that typically worry those who 
argue about either realism vs. moralism, as well as those discussing ideal vs. non-ideal 
theory. It takes seriously the idea that we live in a contemporary global world defined by 
deep normative disagreement (Valentini, 2012) and even a plural distribution of power 
(Hurrell & MacDonald, 2012), yet without necessarily stamping on legitimacy, cosmopolitan 
aspirations, or wider democratic values (Ronzoni, 2012). So again, regardless of whether one 
focuses on cosmopolitanism, realism, or of course cultural relativism, there is good reason 
here to think that promoting a global order centred upon domestic egalitarian liberal 
democracy is an attractive step to take.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The word ‘revolting’, I think, fits normative behaviourism rather well: Empirically, because it 
focuses on acts of revolution (as well as criminal acts); psychologically, because it interprets 
such acts as an expression of the feeling that the status quo is, to those actors, revolting; 
philosophically, because for some it will seem a revolting theory, given its movement from 
an ‘is’ of behaviour to an ‘ought’ of political principles; and politically, because for some it 
will suggest an undue conservatism in the face of, for example, untested cosmopolitan global 
governance. All of which should be clear from the preceding argument. The key question, 
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however, has been whether normative behaviourism provides a realistic approach to global 
political theory, given the apparent ‘fact’ of cultural relativism, to which the answer, or so I 
have claimed, is this: Yes, in the sense that it takes people as they are, without assuming 
away cultural differences in their normative thinking; yes, in the sense that it takes 
institutions as they are, in the sense of how they perform in practice; yes, in the sense that it 
recommends familiar and thus apparently feasible international institutions; but also yes, in 
the sense that it does not either rule out future progress, or even future ideas of a kind that we 
have not yet imagined – bearing in mind that denying the importance of ideas, or the 
possibility of progress, in politics, also shows a lack of realism regarding the way the ‘real 
world’ works (Philp, 2010). So, four-way revulsion, but also four-way realism, in the specific 
senses mentioned, and thus also in the wider Rousseauan sense of taking ‘men as they are and 
laws as they might be’.  
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